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1.
Punishment with Uncertain Outcomes in the Prisoner’s Dilemma
Title:
Punishment with Uncertain Outcomes in the Prisoner’s Dilemma
Author:
Peter Duersch
;
Maroš Servátka
Peter Duersch
;
Maroš Servátka
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This paper experimentally investigates whether riskaverse individuals punish less if the outcome of punishment is uncertain than when it is certain. Our design includes three treatments: Baseline in which the oneshot prisoner’s dilemma game is played; Certain Punishment in which the prisoner’s dilemma game is followed by a punishment stage all...
This paper experimentally investigates whether riskaverse individuals punish less if the outcome of punishment is uncertain than when it is certain. Our design includes three treatments: Baseline in which the oneshot prisoner’s dilemma game is played; Certain Punishment in which the prisoner’s dilemma game is followed by a punishment stage allowing subjects to decrease the other player’s payoff by 2 Euros; and Uncertain Punishment in which subjects could decrease the other player’s payoff with a 50% probability by 1 Euro and with a 50% probability by 3 Euros. We find that in all cases the riskaverse subjects are equally likely to cooperate in the prisoner’s dilemma and equally likely to punish in the second stage in either of the two punishment treatments. ; Experimental economics; prisoner’s dilemma; punishment; risk aversion; uncertainty
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http://www.econ.canterbury.ac.nz/RePEc/cbt/econwp/0912.pdf
http://www.econ.canterbury.ac.nz/RePEc/cbt/econwp/0912.pdf
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RePEc: Research Papers in Economics
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2.
Risky Punishment and Reward in the Prisoner’s Dilemma
Title:
Risky Punishment and Reward in the Prisoner’s Dilemma
Author:
Peter Duersch
;
Maros Servátka
Peter Duersch
;
Maros Servátka
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We conduct a prisoner’s dilemma experiment with a punishment/reward stage, where punishments and rewards are risky. This is compared with a risk free treatment. We find that subjects do not change their behavior in the face of risky outcomes. Additionally, we measure risk attitude and the emotions of subjects. While we find a strong influence of...
We conduct a prisoner’s dilemma experiment with a punishment/reward stage, where punishments and rewards are risky. This is compared with a risk free treatment. We find that subjects do not change their behavior in the face of risky outcomes. Additionally, we measure risk attitude and the emotions of subjects. While we find a strong influence of emotions, individual risk aversion has no effect on the decision to punish or reward. This is good news for lab experiments who abstract from risky outcomes. From the perspective of social preferences, our results provide evidence for risk neutral inclusion of other player’s payoffs in the decisionmaker’s utility function. ; Prisoner’s dilemma, risk, punishment, reward, emotions, experiment
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http://www.uniheidelberg.de/md/awi/forschung/dp451.pdf
http://www.uniheidelberg.de/md/awi/forschung/dp451.pdf
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3.
Punishment with Uncertain Outcomes in the Prisoner’s Dilemma
Title:
Punishment with Uncertain Outcomes in the Prisoner’s Dilemma
Author:
Peter Duersch
;
Maroš Servátka
Peter Duersch
;
Maroš Servátka
Minimize authors
Description:
This paper experimentally investigates whether riskaverse individuals punish less if the outcome of punishment is uncertain than when it is certain. Our design includes three treatments: Baseline in which the oneshot prisoner’s dilemma game is played; Certain Punishment in which the prisoner’s dilemma game is followed by a punishment stage all...
This paper experimentally investigates whether riskaverse individuals punish less if the outcome of punishment is uncertain than when it is certain. Our design includes three treatments: Baseline in which the oneshot prisoner’s dilemma game is played; Certain Punishment in which the prisoner’s dilemma game is followed by a punishment stage allowing subjects to decrease the other player’s payoff by 2 Euros; and Uncertain Punishment in which subjects could decrease the other player’s payoff with a 50% probability by 1 Euro and with a 50% probability by 3 Euros. We find that in all cases the riskaverse subjects are equally likely to cooperate in the prisoner’s dilemma and equally likely to punish in the second stage in either of the two punishment treatments. ; experiment, prisoner’s dilemma, punishment, risk aversion, uncertainty
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http://www.uniheidelberg.de/md/awi/forschung/dp485.pdf
http://www.uniheidelberg.de/md/awi/forschung/dp485.pdf
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4.
Once Beaten, Never Again: Imitation in TwoPlayer Potential Games
Title:
Once Beaten, Never Again: Imitation in TwoPlayer Potential Games
Author:
Peter Duersch
;
Joerg Oechssler
;
Burkhard Schipper
Peter Duersch
;
Joerg Oechssler
;
Burkhard Schipper
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We show that in symmetric twoplayer exact potential games, the simple decision rule "imitateifbetter" cannot be beaten by any strategy in a repeated game by more than the maximal payoff difference of the oneperiod game. Our results apply to many interesting games including examples like 2x2 games, Cournot duopoly, price competition, public g...
We show that in symmetric twoplayer exact potential games, the simple decision rule "imitateifbetter" cannot be beaten by any strategy in a repeated game by more than the maximal payoff difference of the oneperiod game. Our results apply to many interesting games including examples like 2x2 games, Cournot duopoly, price competition, public goods games, common pool resource games, and minimum effort coordination games. ; Imitatethebest, learning, exact potential games, symmetric games, relative payoffs, zerosum games
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http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/working_papers/1112.pdf
http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/working_papers/1112.pdf
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5.
Pure Saddle Points and Symmetric Relative Payoff Games
Title:
Pure Saddle Points and Symmetric Relative Payoff Games
Author:
Peter Duersch
;
Joerg Oechssler
;
Burkhard C. Schipper
Peter Duersch
;
Joerg Oechssler
;
Burkhard C. Schipper
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It is well known that the rockpaperscissors game has no pure saddle point. We show that this holds more generally: A symmetric twoplayer zerosum game has a pure saddle point if and only if it is not a generalized rockpaperscissors game. Moreover, we show that every finite symmetric quasiconcave twoplayer zerosum game has a pure saddle po...
It is well known that the rockpaperscissors game has no pure saddle point. We show that this holds more generally: A symmetric twoplayer zerosum game has a pure saddle point if and only if it is not a generalized rockpaperscissors game. Moreover, we show that every finite symmetric quasiconcave twoplayer zerosum game has a pure saddle point. Further sufficient conditions for existence are provided. We apply our theory to a rich collection of examples by noting that the class of symmetric twoplayer zerosum games coincides with the class of relative payoff games associated with symmetric twoplayer games. This allows us to derive results on the existence of a finite population evolutionary stable strategies. ; symmetric twoplayer games, zerosum games, RockPaperScissors, singlepeakedness, quasiconcavity, finite population evolutionary stable strategy, increasing differences, decreasing differences, potentials, additive separability
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URL:
http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/working_papers/104.pdf
http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/working_papers/104.pdf
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6.
Unbeatable Imitation
Title:
Unbeatable Imitation
Author:
Peter Duersch
;
Joerg Oechssler
;
Burkhard C. Schipper
Peter Duersch
;
Joerg Oechssler
;
Burkhard C. Schipper
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We show that for many classes of symmetric twoplayer games, the simple decision rule ""imitatethebest"" can hardly be beaten by any other decision rule. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for imitation to be unbeatable and show that it can only be beaten by much in games that are of the rockscissorspaper variety. Thus, in many i...
We show that for many classes of symmetric twoplayer games, the simple decision rule ""imitatethebest"" can hardly be beaten by any other decision rule. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for imitation to be unbeatable and show that it can only be beaten by much in games that are of the rockscissorspaper variety. Thus, in many interesting examples, like 2x2 games, Cournot duopoly, price competition, rent seeking, public goods games, common pool resource games, minimum effort coordination games, arms race, search, bargaining, etc., imitation cannot be beaten by much even by a very clever opponent. ; imitatethebest, learning, symmetric games, relative payoffs, zerosum games, rockpaperscissors, finite population ESS, potential games, quasisubmodular games, quasisupermodular games, quasiconcave games, aggregative games
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URL:
http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/working_papers/103.pdf
http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/working_papers/103.pdf
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7.
Pure Strategy Equilibria in Symmetric TwoPlayer ZeroSum Games
Title:
Pure Strategy Equilibria in Symmetric TwoPlayer ZeroSum Games
Author:
Peter Duersch
;
Joerg Oechssler
;
Burkhard Schipper
Peter Duersch
;
Joerg Oechssler
;
Burkhard Schipper
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We observe that a symmetric twoplayer zerosum game has a pure strategy equilibrium if and only if it is not a generalized rockpaperscissors matrix. Moreover, we show that every finite symmetric quasiconcave twoplayer zerosum game has a pure equilibrium. Further sufficient conditions for existence are provided. Our findings extend to genera...
We observe that a symmetric twoplayer zerosum game has a pure strategy equilibrium if and only if it is not a generalized rockpaperscissors matrix. Moreover, we show that every finite symmetric quasiconcave twoplayer zerosum game has a pure equilibrium. Further sufficient conditions for existence are provided. Our findings extend to general twoplayer zerosum games using the symmetrization of zerosum games due to von Neumann. We point out that the class of symmetric twoplayer zerosum games coincides with the class of relative payoff games associated with symmetric twoplayer games. This allows us to derive results on the existence of finite population evolutionary stable strategies. ; Symmetric twoplayer games, zerosum games, RockPaperScissors, singlepeakedness, quasiconcavity, finite population evolutionary stable strategy, saddle point, exact potential games
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URL:
http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/working_papers/1021.pdf
http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/working_papers/1021.pdf
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RePEc: Research Papers in Economics
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8.
Pure Saddle Points and Symmetric Relative Payoff Games
Title:
Pure Saddle Points and Symmetric Relative Payoff Games
Author:
Peter Duersch
;
Joerg Oechssler
;
Burkhard C. Schipper
Peter Duersch
;
Joerg Oechssler
;
Burkhard C. Schipper
Minimize authors
Description:
It is well known that the rockpaperscissors game has no pure saddle point. We show that this holds more generally: A symmetric twoplayer zerosum game has a pure saddle point if and only if it is not a generalized rockpaperscissors game. Moreover, we show that every finite symmetric quasiconcave twoplayer zerosum game has a pure saddle po...
It is well known that the rockpaperscissors game has no pure saddle point. We show that this holds more generally: A symmetric twoplayer zerosum game has a pure saddle point if and only if it is not a generalized rockpaperscissors game. Moreover, we show that every finite symmetric quasiconcave twoplayer zerosum game has a pure saddle point. Further sufficient conditions for existence are provided. We apply our theory to a rich collection of examples by noting that the class of symmetric twoplayer zerosum games coincides with the class of relative payoff games associated with symmetric twoplayer games. This allows us to derive results on the existence of a finite population evolutionary stable strategies. ; symmetric twoplayer games, zerosum games, RockPaperScissors, singlepeakedness, quasiconcavity, finite population evolutionary stable strategy, increasing differences, decreasing differences, potentials, additive separability
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Document Type:
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URL:
http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/working_papers/104.pdf
http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/working_papers/104.pdf
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9.
Unbeatable Imitation
Title:
Unbeatable Imitation
Author:
Peter Duersch
;
Joerg Oechssler
;
Burkhard C. Schipper
Peter Duersch
;
Joerg Oechssler
;
Burkhard C. Schipper
Minimize authors
Description:
We show that for many classes of symmetric twoplayer games, the simple decision rule "imitatethebest" can hardly be beaten by any other decision rule. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for imitation to be unbeatable in the sense that, even against a very clever opponent, imitation is subject to a money pump if and only if the rel...
We show that for many classes of symmetric twoplayer games, the simple decision rule "imitatethebest" can hardly be beaten by any other decision rule. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for imitation to be unbeatable in the sense that, even against a very clever opponent, imitation is subject to a money pump if and only if the relative payoff function of the game is of the rockscissorspaper variety. For many interesting classes of games including examples like 2x2 games, Cournot duopoly, price competition, public goods games, common pool resource games, and minimum effort coordination games, we obtain an even stronger notion of the unbeatability of imitation. ; imitatethebest, learning, symmetric games, relative payoffs, zerosum games, rockpaperscissors, finite population ESS, potential games, quasisubmodular games, quasisupermodular games, quasiconcave games, aggregative games
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http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/working_papers/103.pdf
http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/working_papers/103.pdf
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10.
Sick Pay Provision in Experimental Labor Markets
Title:
Sick Pay Provision in Experimental Labor Markets
Author:
Peter Dürsch
;
Jörg Oechssler
;
Radovan Vadovic
Peter Dürsch
;
Jörg Oechssler
;
Radovan Vadovic
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Sick pay is a common provision in most labor contracts. This paper employs an experimental giftexchange environment to explore two related questions using both managers and undergraduates as subjects. First, do workers reciprocate sick pay in the same way as they reciprocate wage payments? Second, do firms benefit from offering sick pay? Firms ...
Sick pay is a common provision in most labor contracts. This paper employs an experimental giftexchange environment to explore two related questions using both managers and undergraduates as subjects. First, do workers reciprocate sick pay in the same way as they reciprocate wage payments? Second, do firms benefit from offering sick pay? Firms may benefit in two different ways: directly, from workers reciprocating higher sick pay with higher efforts; and indirectly, from selfselection of reciprocal workers into contracts with higher sick pay. Our main finding is that the direct effect is rather weak in terms of effort and negative in terms of profits. However, when there is competition among firms for workers, sick pay can become an important advantage. Consequently, competition leads to a higher provision of sick pay relative to a monopsonistic labor market. ; sick pay, sick leave, experiment, gift exchange
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http://www.uniheidelberg.de/md/awi/forschung/dp476.pdf
http://www.uniheidelberg.de/md/awi/forschung/dp476.pdf
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Author
(34) Duersch, Peter
(25) Oechssler, Jörg
(22) Peter Duersch
(22) Schipper, Burkhard C.
(21) Dürsch, Peter
(13) Jörg Oechssler
(11) Oechssler, Joerg
(10) Burkhard C. Schipper
(10) The Pennsylvania State University CiteSeerX...
(8) Kolb, Albert
(8) Vadovic, Radovan
(7) Albert Kolb
(7) Joerg Oechssler
(6) Schipper, Burkhard
(5) Bauernschuster, Stefan
(5) Dominiak, Adam
(5) Lefort, JeanPhilippe
(5) Maroš Servátka
(5) Peter Dürsch
(4) Burkhard Schipper
(4) Oechssler, Jorg
(4) Schipper, Burkhard C
(3) Müller, Julia
(3) Radovan Vadovic
(2) Eife, Thomas
(2) J. Müller (Julia)
(2) P. Dürsch (Peter)
(2) Servátka, Maros
(2) Stefan Bauernschuster
(1) Chen Bo
(1) Drew Fudenberg
(1) Dürsch, HansPeter
(1) Er Matros
(1) Jelclassifications C
(1) John Stachurski
(1) Jörg Oechsslery
(1) Krau, Ingrid (Prof. Dr.)
(1) Krautzberger, Michael (Prof. Dr.)
(1) Maros Servátka
(1) Muller, Julia
(1) Roth, Benjamin
(1) Römer, Daniel
(1) We Thank Carlos Alósferrer
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Subject
(15) ddc 330
(11) c72
(10) d43
(9) 330
(9) 330 economics
(9) experiment
(9) learning
(7) c73
(6) c91
(6) c92
(6) imitation
(6) zero sum games
(5) cournot duopoly
(5) experiments
(5) fictitious play
(5) internet
(5) strategic teaching
(4) l13
(4) reinforcement
(4) relative payoffs
(4) rock paper scissors
(4) symmetric games
(4) trial error
(3) c72 noncooperative games
(3) computer science computer science and game theory
(3) exact potential games
(3) imitate the best
(3) repeated games
(2) 300 sozialwissenschaften
(2) 338 5
(2) ambiguity
(2) anthropologie
(2) auction
(2) c7
(2) c73 stochastic and dynamic games
(2) c91 design of experiments laboratory
(2) consequentialism
(2) context
(2) d81
(2) dynamic consistency
(2) evolutionary games
(2) experimenter demand effect
(2) finite population ess
(2) finite population evolutionary stable strategy
(2) individual
(2) j3
(2) lernprozess
(2) microéconomie
(2) neutral framing
(2) nichtkooperatives spiel
(2) non expected utility preferences
(2) personal punishment
(2) quasiconcave games
(2) quasiconcavity
(2) real effort task
(2) second price auction
(2) sick leave
(2) sick pay
(2) single peakedness
(2) soziologie
(2) symmetric two player games
(2) test
(2) theorie
(2) updating
(1) 330 wirtschaft
(1) additive separability
(1) adjustment areas § 170 baugb architecture...
(1) aggregative games
(1) and
(1) and tübingen and at the
(1) anpassungsgebiete § 170 baugb architektur...
(1) auktionstheorie
(1) austauschtheorie
(1) betriebliche sozialleistungen
(1) c4 experimentelle analyse von rationalen und...
(1) c9
(1) c9 keywords
(1) c90
(1) c92 design of experiments laboratory
(1) computer science learning
(1) d03
(1) d43 market structure and pricing oligopoly and...
(1) d43 oligopoly and other forms of market...
(1) d44
(1) d81 criteria for decision making under risk and...
(1) d82
(1) ddc 720
(1) decision rules
(1) decreasing differences
(1) discussion paper series of sfb tr 15 governance...
(1) duopol
(1) e31
(1) economic theory
(1) economics
(1) economics general
(1) economics management science
(1) ernesto reuben
(1) evolutionäre spieltheorie
(1) frankfurt
(1) game theory
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Dewey Decimal Classification (DDC)
(23) Economics [33*]
(5) Psychology [15*]
(1) Computer science, knowledge & systems [00*]
(1) Mathematics [51*]
(1) Arts [70*]
(1) Architecture [72*]
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(16) 2010
(7) 2013
(7) 2014
(6) 2012
(4) 2005
(4) 2009
(3) 2008
(2) 2007
(2) 2011
(2) 2015
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(14) EconStor
(10) CiteSeerX
(9) Heidelberg Univ.: HeiDok
(4) DataCite Metadata Store
(3) ArXiv.org
(3) Mannheim Univ.: MADOC
(2) Munich LMU: Munich Personal RePEc Archive (MPRA)
(2) ParisDauphine Univ.: Basepub
(2) Rotterdam Erasmus Univ.: RePub
(1) California Univ.: eScholarship
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(40) Unknown
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