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Title:

Some Asymptotic Results in Discounted Repeated Games of One-Sided Incomplete Information

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The paper analyzes the Nash equilibria of two-person discounted repeated games with one-sided incomplete information and known own payoffs. If the informed player is arbitrarily patient relative to the uninformed player, then the characterization for the informed player's payoffs is essentially the same as that in the undiscounted case. This imp...

The paper analyzes the Nash equilibria of two-person discounted repeated games with one-sided incomplete information and known own payoffs. If the informed player is arbitrarily patient relative to the uninformed player, then the characterization for the informed player's payoffs is essentially the same as that in the undiscounted case. This implies that even small amounts of incomplete information can lead to a discontinuous change in the equilibrium payoff set. For the case of equal discount factors, however, and under an assumption that strictly individually rational payoffs exist, a result akin to the Folk Theorem holds when a complete information game is perturbed by a small amount of incomplete information. ; reputation, Folk Theorem, repeated games, incomplete information Minimize

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Strategic Experimentation: The Case of the Poisson Bandits

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This paper studies a game of strategic experimentation in which the players learn from the experiments of others as well as their own. We first establish the efficient benchmark where the players co-ordinate in order to maximise joint expected payoffs, and then show that, because of free-riding, the strategic problem leads to inefficiently low...

This paper studies a game of strategic experimentation in which the players learn from the experiments of others as well as their own. We first establish the efficient benchmark where the players co-ordinate in order to maximise joint expected payoffs, and then show that, because of free-riding, the strategic problem leads to inefficiently low levels of experimentation in any equilibrium when the players use stationary Markovian strategies. Efficiency can be approximately retrieved provided that the players adopt strategies which slow down the rate at which information is acquired; this is achieved by their taking periodic breaks from experimenting, which get progressively longer. In the public information case (actions and experimental outcomes are both observable), we exhibit a class of non-stationary equilibria in which the $\varepsilon$-efficient amount of experimentation is performed, but only in infinite time. In the private information case (only actions are observable, not outcomes), the breaks have two additional effects: not only do they enable the players to finesse the inference problem, but also they serve to signal their experimental outcome to the other player. We describe an equilibrium with similar non-stationary strategies in which the $\varepsilon$-efficient amount of experimentation is again performed in infinite time, but with a faster rate of information acquisition. The equilibrium rate of information acquisition is slower in the former case because the short-run temptation to free-ride on information acquisition is greater when information is public. Minimize

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Title:

Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations

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Title:

Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships

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Title:

Strategic Experimentation with Exponential Bandits

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We analyze a game of strategic experimentation with two-armed bandits whose risky arm might yield payoffs after exponentially distributed random times. Free-riding causes an inefficiently low level of experimentation in any equilibrium where the players use stationary Markovian strategies with beliefs as the state variable. We construct the uniq...

We analyze a game of strategic experimentation with two-armed bandits whose risky arm might yield payoffs after exponentially distributed random times. Free-riding causes an inefficiently low level of experimentation in any equilibrium where the players use stationary Markovian strategies with beliefs as the state variable. We construct the unique symmetric Markovian equilibrium of the game, followed by various asymmetric ones. There is no equilibrium where all players use simple cut-off strategies. Equilibria where players switch finitely often between experimenting and free-riding all yield a similar pattern of information acquisition, greater efficiency being achieved when the players share the burden of experimentation more equitably. When players switch roles infinitely often, they can acquire an approximately efficient amount of information, but still at an inefficient rate. In terms of aggregate payoffs, all these asymmetric equilibria dominate the symmetric one wherever the latter prescribes simultaneous use of both arms. Copyright The Econometric Society 2005. Minimize

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Strategic Experimentation with Exponential Bandits

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This paper studies a game of strategic experimentation with two-armed bandits whose risky arm might yield a payoff only after some exponentially distributed random time. Because of free-riding, there is an inefficiently low level of experimentation in any equilibrium where the players use stationary Markovian strategies with posterior beliefs as...

This paper studies a game of strategic experimentation with two-armed bandits whose risky arm might yield a payoff only after some exponentially distributed random time. Because of free-riding, there is an inefficiently low level of experimentation in any equilibrium where the players use stationary Markovian strategies with posterior beliefs as the state variable. After characterizing the unique symmetric Markovian equilibrium of the game, which is in mixed strategies, we construct a variety of pure-strategy equilibria. There is no equilibrium where all players use simple cut-off strategies. Equilibria where players switch finitely often between the roles of experimenter and free-rider all lead to the same pattern of information acquisition; the efficiency of these equilibria depends on the way players share the burden of experimentation among them. In equilibria where players switch roles infinitely often, they can acquire an approximately efficient amount of information, but the rate at which it is acquired still remains inefficient; moreoever, the expected payoff of an experimenter exhibits the novel feature that it rises as players become more pessimistic. Finally, over the range of beliefs where players use both arms a positive fraction of the time, the symmetric equilibrium is dominated by any asymmetric one in terms of aggregate payoffs. ; strategic experimentation, two-armed bandit, exponential distribution, Bayesian learning, Markov perfect equilibrium, public goods Minimize

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Title:

Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations

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Reputation: The New Palgrave Dictionary

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We explain what reputation effects are, how they arise and the factors that limit or strenghten them.

We explain what reputation effects are, how they arise and the factors that limit or strenghten them. Minimize

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The Pennsylvania State University CiteSeerX Archives

Year of Publication:

2011-10-20

Source:

http://else.econ.ucl.ac.uk/papers/uploaded/252.pdf

http://else.econ.ucl.ac.uk/papers/uploaded/252.pdf Minimize

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text

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en

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V ≡ { (x ; y ; x> 0 ; y> −1/3 ; y ≤ x ; y ≤ 3 − 2x} ⊂ R 2

V ≡ { (x ; y ; x> 0 ; y> −1/3 ; y ≤ x ; y ≤ 3 − 2x} ⊂ R 2 Minimize

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Metadata may be used without restrictions as long as the oai identifier remains attached to it.

Metadata may be used without restrictions as long as the oai identifier remains attached to it. Minimize

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Title:

Reputation: The New Palstave Dictionary

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We explain what reputation effects are, how they arise and the factors that limit or strengthen them.

We explain what reputation effects are, how they arise and the factors that limit or strengthen them. Minimize

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The Pennsylvania State University CiteSeerX Archives

Year of Publication:

2011-10-20

Source:

http://www.olin.wustl.edu/faculty/cripps/Palgrave.pdf

http://www.olin.wustl.edu/faculty/cripps/Palgrave.pdf Minimize

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Metadata may be used without restrictions as long as the oai identifier remains attached to it.

Metadata may be used without restrictions as long as the oai identifier remains attached to it. Minimize

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Title:

Optimal Complementary Auctions

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Consider the situation where two products are sold by the same seller, but to disjoint sets of potential buyers. Also that externalities may arise from each market outcome to the other. This paper examines the nature of the seller's optimal mechanism, and, for example in the case of positive externalities, it is shown that the allocation decisio...

Consider the situation where two products are sold by the same seller, but to disjoint sets of potential buyers. Also that externalities may arise from each market outcome to the other. This paper examines the nature of the seller's optimal mechanism, and, for example in the case of positive externalities, it is shown that the allocation decision in either market depends on the highest types in both markets. The optimal mechanism can be implemented by an indirect mechanism that essentially charges winning bidders for the value of their externalities. The analysis is applied to the sale of public sector franchises including exploration and development rights for oil and gas tracts. Minimize

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The Pennsylvania State University CiteSeerX Archives

Year of Publication:

2011-12-22

Source:

http://www.olin.wustl.edu/faculty/cripps/Optimal%20Complementary%20Auctions.pdf

http://www.olin.wustl.edu/faculty/cripps/Optimal%20Complementary%20Auctions.pdf Minimize

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text

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en

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Metadata may be used without restrictions as long as the oai identifier remains attached to it.

Metadata may be used without restrictions as long as the oai identifier remains attached to it. Minimize

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