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Title:

Enfam deve ser protagonista na concepção de um novo judiciário

Publisher:

Escola Nacional d Formação e Aperfeiçoamento de Magistrados

Year of Publication:

2011-04-04

Source:

Boletim da Enfam; n. 6 (abr./maio 2010); p. 3-4

Boletim da Enfam; n. 6 (abr./maio 2010); p. 3-4 Minimize

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Title:

Ministro Felix Fischer

Publisher:

Escola Nacional d Formação e Aperfeiçoamento de Magistrados

Year of Publication:

2011-04-04

Source:

Boletim da Enfam; n. 2 (jul./ago. 2009); p. 3-4

Boletim da Enfam; n. 2 (jul./ago. 2009); p. 3-4 Minimize

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Title:

Ministro Fernando Gonçalves: perfil

Publisher:

Superior Tribunal de Justiça

Year of Publication:

2010-07-27

Source:

Ministros do Superior Tribunal de Justiça no Tribunal Superior Eleitoral; v. 2, n. 6 (2010): Julgados do Ministro Fernando Gonçalves; p. 11

Ministros do Superior Tribunal de Justiça no Tribunal Superior Eleitoral; v. 2, n. 6 (2010): Julgados do Ministro Fernando Gonçalves; p. 11 Minimize

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Title:

Ministro Ari Pargendler: perfil

Publisher:

Superior Tribunal de Justiça

Year of Publication:

2010-07-27

Source:

Ministros do Superior Tribunal de Justiça no Tribunal Superior Eleitoral; v. 2, n. 4 (2010): Julgados do Ministro Ari Pargendler; p. 11-12

Ministros do Superior Tribunal de Justiça no Tribunal Superior Eleitoral; v. 2, n. 4 (2010): Julgados do Ministro Ari Pargendler; p. 11-12 Minimize

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Title:

Computational Aspects of Covering in Dominance Graphs

Description:

Various problems in AI and multiagent systems can be tackled by finding the “most desirable” elements of a set given some binary relation. Examples can be found in areas as diverse as voting theory, game theory, and argumentation theory. Some particularly attractive solution sets are defined in terms of a covering relation—a transitive subrelati...

Various problems in AI and multiagent systems can be tackled by finding the “most desirable” elements of a set given some binary relation. Examples can be found in areas as diverse as voting theory, game theory, and argumentation theory. Some particularly attractive solution sets are defined in terms of a covering relation—a transitive subrelation of the original relation. We consider three different types of covering (upward, downward, and bidirectional) and the corresponding solution concepts known as the uncovered set and the minimal covering set. We present the first polynomialtime algorithm for finding the minimal bidirectional covering set (an acknowledged open problem) and prove that deciding whether an alternative is in a minimal upward or downward covering set is NP-hard. Furthermore, we obtain various set-theoretical inclusions, which reveal a strong connection between von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets and upward covering on the one hand, and the Banks set and downward covering on the other hand. In particular, we show that every stable set is also a minimal upward covering set. Minimize

Contributors:

The Pennsylvania State University CiteSeerX Archives

Year of Publication:

2010-05-31

Source:

http://www7.in.tum.de/~brandtf/papers/aaai2007.pdf

http://www7.in.tum.de/~brandtf/papers/aaai2007.pdf Minimize

Document Type:

text

Language:

en

DDC:

511 General principles of mathematics *(computed)*

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Metadata may be used without restrictions as long as the oai identifier remains attached to it.

Metadata may be used without restrictions as long as the oai identifier remains attached to it. Minimize

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Title:

On the Hardness and Existence of Quasi-Strict Equilibria∗

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Abstract. This paper investigates the computational properties of quasi-strict equilibrium, an attractive equilibrium refinement proposed by Harsanyi, which was recently shown to always exist in bimatrix games. We prove that deciding the existence of a quasi-strict equilibrium in games with more than two players is NP-complete. We further show t...

Abstract. This paper investigates the computational properties of quasi-strict equilibrium, an attractive equilibrium refinement proposed by Harsanyi, which was recently shown to always exist in bimatrix games. We prove that deciding the existence of a quasi-strict equilibrium in games with more than two players is NP-complete. We further show that, in contrast to Nash equilibrium, the support of quasi-strict equi-librium in zero-sum games is unique and propose a linear program to compute quasi-strict equilibria in these games. Finally, we prove that every symmetric multi-player game where each player has two actions at his disposal contains an efficiently computable quasi-strict equilibrium which may itself be asymmetric. 1 Minimize

Contributors:

The Pennsylvania State University CiteSeerX Archives

Year of Publication:

2014-12-01

Source:

http://dss.in.tum.de/files/brandt-research/quasistrict.pdf

http://dss.in.tum.de/files/brandt-research/quasistrict.pdf Minimize

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text

Language:

en

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Metadata may be used without restrictions as long as the oai identifier remains attached to it.

Metadata may be used without restrictions as long as the oai identifier remains attached to it. Minimize

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Title:

On the Hardness and Existence of Quasi-Strict Equilibria

Description:

This paper investigates the computational properties of quasi-strict equilibrium, an attractive equilibrium refinement proposed by Harsanyi, which was recently shown to always exist in bimatrix games. We prove that deciding the existence of a quasi-strict equilibrium in games with more than two players is NP-complete. We further show that, in co...

This paper investigates the computational properties of quasi-strict equilibrium, an attractive equilibrium refinement proposed by Harsanyi, which was recently shown to always exist in bimatrix games. We prove that deciding the existence of a quasi-strict equilibrium in games with more than two players is NP-complete. We further show that, in contrast to Nash equilibrium, the support of quasi-strict equilibrium in zero-sum games is unique and propose a linear program to compute quasi-strict equilibria in these games. Finally, we prove that every symmetric multi-player game where each player has two actions at his disposal contains an efficiently computable quasi-strict equilibrium which may itself be asymmetric. Minimize

Contributors:

The Pennsylvania State University CiteSeerX Archives

Year of Publication:

2010-10-27

Source:

http://www.tcs.informatik.uni-muenchen.de/%7Efischerf/publications/bf_sagt08.pdf

http://www.tcs.informatik.uni-muenchen.de/%7Efischerf/publications/bf_sagt08.pdf Minimize

Document Type:

text

Language:

en

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Metadata may be used without restrictions as long as the oai identifier remains attached to it.

Metadata may be used without restrictions as long as the oai identifier remains attached to it. Minimize

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Title:

On the Hardness and Existence of Quasi-Strict Equilibria

Description:

This paper investigates the computational properties of quasi-strict equilibrium, an attractive equilibrium refinement proposed by Harsanyi, which was recently shown to always exist in bimatrix games. We prove that deciding the existence of a quasi-strict equilibrium in games with more than two players is NP-complete. We further show that, in co...

This paper investigates the computational properties of quasi-strict equilibrium, an attractive equilibrium refinement proposed by Harsanyi, which was recently shown to always exist in bimatrix games. We prove that deciding the existence of a quasi-strict equilibrium in games with more than two players is NP-complete. We further show that, in contrast to Nash equilibrium, the support of quasi-strict equilibrium in zero-sum games is unique and propose a linear program to compute quasi-strict equilibria in these games. Finally, we prove that every symmetric multi-player game where each player has two actions at his disposal contains an efficiently computable quasi-strict equilibrium which may itself be asymmetric. Minimize

Contributors:

The Pennsylvania State University CiteSeerX Archives

Year of Publication:

2010-05-31

Source:

http://www7.in.tum.de/~brandtf/papers/quasistrict.pdf

http://www7.in.tum.de/~brandtf/papers/quasistrict.pdf Minimize

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text

Language:

en

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Title:

Computing the minimal covering set

Description:

We present the first polynomial-time algorithm for computing the minimal covering set of a (weak) tournament. The algorithm draws upon a linear programming formulation of a subset of the minimal covering set known as the essential set. On the other hand, we show that no efficient algorithm exists for two variants of the minimal covering set, the...

We present the first polynomial-time algorithm for computing the minimal covering set of a (weak) tournament. The algorithm draws upon a linear programming formulation of a subset of the minimal covering set known as the essential set. On the other hand, we show that no efficient algorithm exists for two variants of the minimal covering set, the minimal upward covering set and the minimal downward covering set, unless P equals NP. Finally, we observe a strong relationship between von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets and upward covering on the one hand, and the Banks set and downward covering on the other. Minimize

Publisher:

ACM Press

Contributors:

The Pennsylvania State University CiteSeerX Archives

Year of Publication:

2009-12-26

Source:

http://www7.in.tum.de/~brandtf/papers/covering.pdf

http://www7.in.tum.de/~brandtf/papers/covering.pdf Minimize

Document Type:

text

Language:

en

Subjects:

Social Choice Theory ; Minimal Covering Set ; Essential Set ; Uncovered Set ; Computational Complexity JEL classification codes

Social Choice Theory ; Minimal Covering Set ; Essential Set ; Uncovered Set ; Computational Complexity JEL classification codes Minimize

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Title:

PageRank as a Weak Tournament Solution

Description:

We observe that ranking systems—a theoretical framework for web page ranking and collaborative filtering introduced by Altman and Tennenholtz—and tournament solutions—a well-studied area of social choice theory—are strongly related. This relationship permits a mutual transfer of axioms and solution concepts. As a first step, we formally analyze ...

We observe that ranking systems—a theoretical framework for web page ranking and collaborative filtering introduced by Altman and Tennenholtz—and tournament solutions—a well-studied area of social choice theory—are strongly related. This relationship permits a mutual transfer of axioms and solution concepts. As a first step, we formally analyze a tournament solution that is based on Google’s PageRank algorithm and study its interrelationships with common tournament solutions. It turns out that the PageRank set is always contained in both the Schwartz set and the uncovered set, but may be disjoint from most other tournament solutions. While PageRank does not satisfy various standard properties from the tournament literature, it can be much more discriminatory than established tournament solutions. Minimize

Contributors:

The Pennsylvania State University CiteSeerX Archives

Year of Publication:

2010-10-27

Source:

http://www.tcs.ifi.lmu.de/~brandtf/papers/pagerank.pdf

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text

Language:

en

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