Loading

Error: Cannot Load Popup Box

Hit List

Title:

Existence of a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in imperfectly discriminating contests

Description:

We consider a general class of imperfectly discriminating contests with privately informed players. We show that findings by Athey (2001) imply the existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in monotone pure strategies. ; contest, imperfectly discriminating, asymmetric information, equilibrium existence, interdependent values

We consider a general class of imperfectly discriminating contests with privately informed players. We show that findings by Athey (2001) imply the existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in monotone pure strategies. ; contest, imperfectly discriminating, asymmetric information, equilibrium existence, interdependent values Minimize

Document Type:

preprint

Content Provider:

My Lists:

My Tags:

Notes:

Title:

Rent-seeking Contests under Symmetric and Asymmetric Information

Description:

We consider a variant of the Tullock rent-seeking contest. Under symmetric information we determine equilibrium strategies and prove their uniqueness. Then, we assume contestants to be privately informed about their costs of effort. We prove existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium and provide a sufficient condition for uniqueness. Comparing dif...

We consider a variant of the Tullock rent-seeking contest. Under symmetric information we determine equilibrium strategies and prove their uniqueness. Then, we assume contestants to be privately informed about their costs of effort. We prove existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium and provide a sufficient condition for uniqueness. Comparing different informational settings we find that if players are uncertain about the costs of all players, aggregate effort is lower than under both private and complete information. Yet, under additional assumptions, rent dissipation is still smaller in the latter settings. Numerical examples illustrate that there is no general ranking between private and complete information. The results depend on the distribution costs are drawn from and on the exact specification of the contest success function. ; Rent-seeking, Contest, Asymmetric Information, Private values Minimize

Document Type:

preprint

Content Provider:

My Lists:

My Tags:

Notes:

Title:

SIGNALING IN AUCTIONS AMONG COMPETITORS

Author:

Description:

We consider a model of oligopolistic firms that have private information about their cost structure. Prior to competing in the market a competitive advantage, i.e., a cost reducing technology, is allocated to a subset of the firms by means of a multi-object auction. After the auction either all bids or only the prices to be paid are revealed to ...

We consider a model of oligopolistic firms that have private information about their cost structure. Prior to competing in the market a competitive advantage, i.e., a cost reducing technology, is allocated to a subset of the firms by means of a multi-object auction. After the auction either all bids or only the prices to be paid are revealed to all firms. This provides an opportunity for signaling. Whether there exists an equilibrium in which bids perfectly identify the bidders’ costs generally depends on the type and fierceness of the market competition, the specific auction format, and the bid announcement policy. ; Auction; Oligopoly; Signaling Minimize

Document Type:

preprint

Content Provider:

My Lists:

My Tags:

Notes:

Title:

Rent-seeking Contests under Symmetric and Asymmetric Information

Description:

We consider a variant of the Tullock rent-seeking contest. Under symmetric information we determine equilibrium strategies and prove their uniqueness. Then, we assume contestants to be privately informed about their costs of effort. We prove existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium and provide a sufficient condition for uniqueness. Comparing dif...

We consider a variant of the Tullock rent-seeking contest. Under symmetric information we determine equilibrium strategies and prove their uniqueness. Then, we assume contestants to be privately informed about their costs of effort. We prove existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium and provide a sufficient condition for uniqueness. Comparing different informational settings we find that if players are uncertain about the costs of all players, aggregate effort is lower than under both private and complete information. Yet, under additional assumptions, rent dissipation is still smaller in the latter settings. Numerical examples illustrate that there is no general ranking between private and complete information. The results depend on the distribution costs are drawn from and on the exact specification of the contest success function. Minimize

Publisher:

Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems München

Year of Publication:

2010

Document Type:

doc-type:workingPaper

Language:

eng

Subjects:

D72 ; D74 ; D82 ; C72 ; ddc:330 ; Rent-seeking ; Contest ; Asymmetric Information ; Private values ; Auktionstheorie ; Rent-Seeking ; Asymmetrische Information ; Theorie

D72 ; D74 ; D82 ; C72 ; ddc:330 ; Rent-seeking ; Contest ; Asymmetric Information ; Private values ; Auktionstheorie ; Rent-Seeking ; Asymmetrische Information ; Theorie Minimize

DDC:

Rights:

http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen

http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen Minimize

Relations:

SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper 311

Content Provider:

My Lists:

My Tags:

Notes:

Title:

Existence of a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in imperfectly discriminating contests

Description:

We consider a general class of imperfectly discriminating contests with privately informed players. We show that findings by Athey (2001) imply the existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in monotone pure strategies.

We consider a general class of imperfectly discriminating contests with privately informed players. We show that findings by Athey (2001) imply the existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in monotone pure strategies. Minimize

Publisher:

Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems München

Year of Publication:

2010

Document Type:

doc-type:workingPaper

Language:

eng

Subjects:

D72 ; D74 ; D82 ; C72 ; ddc:330 ; contest ; imperfectly discriminating ; asymmetric information ; equilibrium existence ; interdependent values ; Wettbewerb ; Nichtkooperatives Spiel ; Asymmetrische Information ; Nash-Gleichgewicht ; Theorie

D72 ; D74 ; D82 ; C72 ; ddc:330 ; contest ; imperfectly discriminating ; asymmetric information ; equilibrium existence ; interdependent values ; Wettbewerb ; Nichtkooperatives Spiel ; Asymmetrische Information ; Nash-Gleichgewicht ; Theorie Minimize

DDC:

Rights:

http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen

http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen Minimize

Relations:

SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper 331

Content Provider:

My Lists:

My Tags:

Notes:

Title:

Rent-seeking Contests under Symmetric and Asymmetric Information

Description:

We consider a variant of the Tullock rent-seeking contest. Under symmetric information we determine equilibrium strategies and prove their uniqueness. Then, we assume contestants to be privately informed about their costs of effort. We prove existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium and provide a sufficient condition for uniqueness. Comparing dif...

We consider a variant of the Tullock rent-seeking contest. Under symmetric information we determine equilibrium strategies and prove their uniqueness. Then, we assume contestants to be privately informed about their costs of effort. We prove existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium and provide a sufficient condition for uniqueness. Comparing different informational settings we find that if players are uncertain about the costs of all players, aggregate effort is lower than under both private and complete information. Yet rent dissipation might still be smaller in the latter settings. Numerical examples provide additional insight into the impact of the information structure. Minimize

Publisher:

Verein für Socialpolitik Frankfurt a. M.

Year of Publication:

2010

Document Type:

doc-type:conferenceObject

Language:

eng

Subjects:

D72 ; D82 ; D74 ; ddc:330 ; Rent-seeking ; Contest ; Asymmetric Information ; Private values

D72 ; D82 ; D74 ; ddc:330 ; Rent-seeking ; Contest ; Asymmetric Information ; Private values Minimize

DDC:

Rights:

http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen

http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen Minimize

Relations:

Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Information and Contests D16-V3

Content Provider:

My Lists:

My Tags:

Notes:

Title:

Existence of a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in imperfectly discriminating contests

Description:

We consider a general class of imperfectly discriminating contests with privately informed players. We show that findings by Athey (2001) imply the existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in monotone pure strategies.

We consider a general class of imperfectly discriminating contests with privately informed players. We show that findings by Athey (2001) imply the existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in monotone pure strategies. Minimize

Year of Publication:

2010-07-01

Document Type:

doc-type:workingPaper ; Paper ; NonPeerReviewed

Language:

eng

Subjects:

Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems ; A7 - Auktionen ; Anreizprobleme und Wettbewerb ; ddc:330

Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems ; A7 - Auktionen ; Anreizprobleme und Wettbewerb ; ddc:330 Minimize

Relations:

http://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13223/1/331.pdf ; Wasser, Cédric (Juli 2010): Existence of a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in imperfectly discriminating contests. SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 331

URL:

Content Provider:

My Lists:

My Tags:

Notes:

Title:

Rent-seeking Contests under Symmetric and Asymmetric Information

Description:

We consider a variant of the Tullock rent-seeking contest. Under symmetric information we determine equilibrium strategies and prove their uniqueness. Then, we assume contestants to be privately informed about their costs of effort. We prove existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium and provide a sufficient condition for uniqueness. Comparing different informational settings we find that if players are uncertain about the costs of all players, aggregate effort is lower than under both private and complete information. Yet, under additional assumptions, rent dissipation is still smaller in the latter settings. Numerical examples illustrate that there is no general ranking between private and complete information. The results depend on the distribution costs are drawn from and on the exact specification of the contest success function. Minimize

Year of Publication:

2010-03-01

Document Type:

doc-type:workingPaper ; Paper ; NonPeerReviewed

Language:

eng

Subjects:

Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems ; A7 - Auktionen ; Anreizprobleme und Wettbewerb ; ddc:330

Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems ; A7 - Auktionen ; Anreizprobleme und Wettbewerb ; ddc:330 Minimize

Relations:

http://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13243/1/311.pdf ; Wasser, Cédric (März 2010): Rent-seeking Contests under Symmetric and Asymmetric Information. SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 311

URL:

Content Provider:

My Lists:

My Tags:

Notes:

Title:

Signaling in Auctions among Competitors

Author:

Description:

We consider a model of oligopolistic firms that have private information about their cost structure. Prior to competing in the market a competitive advantage, i.e., a cost reducing technology, is allocated to a subset of the firms by means of a multi-object auction. After the auction either all bids or only the prices to be paid are revealed to ...

We consider a model of oligopolistic firms that have private information about their cost structure. Prior to competing in the market a competitive advantage, i.e., a cost reducing technology, is allocated to a subset of the firms by means of a multi-object auction. After the auction either all bids or only the prices to be paid are revealed to all firms. This provides an opportunity for signaling. Whether there exists an equilibrium in which bids perfectly identify the bidders' costs generally depends on the type and fierceness of the market competition, the specific auction format, and the bid announcement policy. Minimize

Publisher:

Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems München

Year of Publication:

2010

Document Type:

doc-type:workingPaper

Language:

eng

Subjects:

D44 ; L13 ; D43 ; D82 ; C72 ; ddc:330 ; Auction ; Oligopoly ; Signaling ; Auktionstheorie ; Signalling ; Wettbewerb ; Theorie

D44 ; L13 ; D43 ; D82 ; C72 ; ddc:330 ; Auction ; Oligopoly ; Signaling ; Auktionstheorie ; Signalling ; Wettbewerb ; Theorie Minimize

DDC:

Rights:

http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen

http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen Minimize

Relations:

SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper 293

Content Provider:

My Lists:

My Tags:

Notes:

Title:

Signaling in Auctions among Competitors

Author:

Description:

We consider a model of oligopolistic firms that have private information about their cost structure. Prior to competing in the market a competitive advantage, i.e., a cost reducing technology, is allocated to a subset of the firms by means of a multi-object auction. After the auction either all bids or only the prices to be paid are revealed to ...

We consider a model of oligopolistic firms that have private information about their cost structure. Prior to competing in the market a competitive advantage, i.e., a cost reducing technology, is allocated to a subset of the firms by means of a multi-object auction. After the auction either all bids or only the prices to be paid are revealed to all firms. This provides an opportunity for signaling. Whether there exists an equilibrium in which bids perfectly identify the bidders’ costs generally depends on the type and fierceness of the market competition, the specific auction format, and the bid announcement policy. Minimize

Year of Publication:

2010-01-01

Document Type:

doc-type:workingPaper ; Paper ; NonPeerReviewed

Language:

eng

Subjects:

Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems ; A7 - Auktionen ; Anreizprobleme und Wettbewerb ; ddc:330

Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems ; A7 - Auktionen ; Anreizprobleme und Wettbewerb ; ddc:330 Minimize

Relations:

http://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13261/1/293.pdf ; Scarpatetti, Benedikt von und Wasser, Cédric (Januar 2010): Signaling in Auctions among Competitors. SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 293

URL:

Content Provider:

My Lists:

My Tags:

Notes:

Currently in BASE: 68,072,316 Documents of 3,307 Content Sources

http://www.base-search.net