Loading
Error: Cannot Load Popup Box
Skip to hit list
Adjust your hit list
Further result pages
Mobile

A
A
A

A

English
Deutsch
Français
Español
Polski
Ελληνικά
Українська
中文
 Logged in as

Log Out

Login
BASIC
SEARCH
ADVANCED
SEARCH
HELP
BROWSING
SEARCH
HISTORY
Your search
Search For:
Entire Document
Title
Author
Subject
Boost open access documents
Find
Linguistics tools
Verbatim search
Additional word forms
Multilingual synonyms
Statistics
12 hits
in 72,227,055 documents
in 0.20 seconds
Please leave the following field blank:
Home
»
Search: Cédric Wasser
Hit List
Hit list
1.
Rentseeking Contests under Symmetric and Asymmetric Information
Title:
Rentseeking Contests under Symmetric and Asymmetric Information
Author:
Cédric Wasser
Cédric Wasser
Minimize authors
Description:
We consider a variant of the Tullock rentseeking contest. Under symmetric information we determine equilibrium strategies and prove their uniqueness. Then, we assume contestants to be privately informed about their costs of effort. We prove existence of a purestrategy equilibrium and provide a sufficient condition for uniqueness. Comparing dif...
We consider a variant of the Tullock rentseeking contest. Under symmetric information we determine equilibrium strategies and prove their uniqueness. Then, we assume contestants to be privately informed about their costs of effort. We prove existence of a purestrategy equilibrium and provide a sufficient condition for uniqueness. Comparing different informational settings we find that if players are uncertain about the costs of all players, aggregate effort is lower than under both private and complete information. Yet, under additional assumptions, rent dissipation is still smaller in the latter settings. Numerical examples illustrate that there is no general ranking between private and complete information. The results depend on the distribution costs are drawn from and on the exact specification of the contest success function. ; Rentseeking, Contest, Asymmetric Information, Private values
Minimize
Document Type:
preprint
URL:
http://www.sfbtr15.de/dipa/311.pdf
http://www.sfbtr15.de/dipa/311.pdf
Minimize
Content Provider:
RePEc: Research Papers in Economics
My Lists:
My Tags:
Notes:
Detail View
Email this
Export Record
Export Record
» RefWorks
» EndNote
» RIS
» BibTeX
» MARC
» RDF
» RTF
» JSON
» YAML
Add to Favorites
Check in Google Scholar
Add to another List
Edit Favorit
Delete from Favorites
2.
Existence of a purestrategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in imperfectly discriminating contests
Title:
Existence of a purestrategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in imperfectly discriminating contests
Author:
Cédric Wasser
Cédric Wasser
Minimize authors
Description:
We consider a general class of imperfectly discriminating contests with privately informed players. We show that findings by Athey (2001) imply the existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in monotone pure strategies. ; contest, imperfectly discriminating, asymmetric information, equilibrium existence, interdependent values
We consider a general class of imperfectly discriminating contests with privately informed players. We show that findings by Athey (2001) imply the existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in monotone pure strategies. ; contest, imperfectly discriminating, asymmetric information, equilibrium existence, interdependent values
Minimize
Document Type:
preprint
URL:
http://www.sfbtr15.de/dipa/331.pdf
http://www.sfbtr15.de/dipa/331.pdf
Minimize
Content Provider:
RePEc: Research Papers in Economics
My Lists:
My Tags:
Notes:
Detail View
Email this
Export Record
Export Record
» RefWorks
» EndNote
» RIS
» BibTeX
» MARC
» RDF
» RTF
» JSON
» YAML
Add to Favorites
Check in Google Scholar
Add to another List
Edit Favorit
Delete from Favorites
3.
SIGNALING IN AUCTIONS AMONG COMPETITORS
Title:
SIGNALING IN AUCTIONS AMONG COMPETITORS
Author:
Benedikt von Scarpatetti
;
Cédric Wasser
Benedikt von Scarpatetti
;
Cédric Wasser
Minimize authors
Description:
We consider a model of oligopolistic firms that have private information about their cost structure. Prior to competing in the market a competitive advantage, i.e., a cost reducing technology, is allocated to a subset of the firms by means of a multiobject auction. After the auction either all bids or only the prices to be paid are revealed to ...
We consider a model of oligopolistic firms that have private information about their cost structure. Prior to competing in the market a competitive advantage, i.e., a cost reducing technology, is allocated to a subset of the firms by means of a multiobject auction. After the auction either all bids or only the prices to be paid are revealed to all firms. This provides an opportunity for signaling. Whether there exists an equilibrium in which bids perfectly identify the bidders’ costs generally depends on the type and fierceness of the market competition, the specific auction format, and the bid announcement policy. ; Auction; Oligopoly; Signaling
Minimize
Document Type:
preprint
URL:
http://www.sfbtr15.de/dipa/293.pdf
http://www.sfbtr15.de/dipa/293.pdf
Minimize
Content Provider:
RePEc: Research Papers in Economics
My Lists:
My Tags:
Notes:
Detail View
Email this
Export Record
Export Record
» RefWorks
» EndNote
» RIS
» BibTeX
» MARC
» RDF
» RTF
» JSON
» YAML
Add to Favorites
Check in Google Scholar
Add to another List
Edit Favorit
Delete from Favorites
4.
Rentseeking Contests under Symmetric and Asymmetric Information
Open Access
Title:
Rentseeking Contests under Symmetric and Asymmetric Information
Author:
Wasser, Cédric
Wasser, Cédric
Minimize authors
Description:
We consider a variant of the Tullock rentseeking contest. Under symmetric information we determine equilibrium strategies and prove their uniqueness. Then, we assume contestants to be privately informed about their costs of effort. We prove existence of a purestrategy equilibrium and provide a sufficient condition for uniqueness. Comparing dif...
We consider a variant of the Tullock rentseeking contest. Under symmetric information we determine equilibrium strategies and prove their uniqueness. Then, we assume contestants to be privately informed about their costs of effort. We prove existence of a purestrategy equilibrium and provide a sufficient condition for uniqueness. Comparing different informational settings we find that if players are uncertain about the costs of all players, aggregate effort is lower than under both private and complete information. Yet, under additional assumptions, rent dissipation is still smaller in the latter settings. Numerical examples illustrate that there is no general ranking between private and complete information. The results depend on the distribution costs are drawn from and on the exact specification of the contest success function.
Minimize
Publisher:
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems München
Year of Publication:
2010
Document Type:
doctype:workingPaper
Language:
eng
Subjects:
D72 ; D74 ; D82 ; C72 ; ddc:330 ; Rentseeking ; Contest ; Asymmetric Information ; Private values ; Auktionstheorie ; RentSeeking ; Asymmetrische Information ; Theorie
D72 ; D74 ; D82 ; C72 ; ddc:330 ; Rentseeking ; Contest ; Asymmetric Information ; Private values ; Auktionstheorie ; RentSeeking ; Asymmetrische Information ; Theorie
Minimize
DDC:
330 Economics
Rights:
http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
Minimize
Relations:
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper 311
URL:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/94168
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/94168
Minimize
Content Provider:
EconStor (German National Library of Economics, ZBW)
My Lists:
My Tags:
Notes:
Detail View
Email this
Export Record
Export Record
» RefWorks
» EndNote
» RIS
» BibTeX
» MARC
» RDF
» RTF
» JSON
» YAML
Add to Favorites
Check in Google Scholar
Add to another List
Edit Favorit
Delete from Favorites
5.
Rentseeking Contests under Symmetric and Asymmetric Information
Open Access
Title:
Rentseeking Contests under Symmetric and Asymmetric Information
Author:
Wasser, Cédric
Wasser, Cédric
Minimize authors
Description:
We consider a variant of the Tullock rentseeking contest. Under symmetric information we determine equilibrium strategies and prove their uniqueness. Then, we assume contestants to be privately informed about their costs of effort. We prove existence of a purestrategy equilibrium and provide a sufficient condition for uniqueness. Comparing dif...
We consider a variant of the Tullock rentseeking contest. Under symmetric information we determine equilibrium strategies and prove their uniqueness. Then, we assume contestants to be privately informed about their costs of effort. We prove existence of a purestrategy equilibrium and provide a sufficient condition for uniqueness. Comparing different informational settings we find that if players are uncertain about the costs of all players, aggregate effort is lower than under both private and complete information. Yet rent dissipation might still be smaller in the latter settings. Numerical examples provide additional insight into the impact of the information structure.
Minimize
Publisher:
Verein für Socialpolitik Frankfurt a. M.
Year of Publication:
2010
Document Type:
doctype:conferenceObject
Language:
eng
Subjects:
D72 ; D82 ; D74 ; ddc:330 ; Rentseeking ; Contest ; Asymmetric Information ; Private values
D72 ; D82 ; D74 ; ddc:330 ; Rentseeking ; Contest ; Asymmetric Information ; Private values
Minimize
DDC:
330 Economics
Rights:
http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
Minimize
Relations:
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie  Session: Information and Contests D16V3
URL:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37351
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37351
Minimize
Content Provider:
EconStor (German National Library of Economics, ZBW)
My Lists:
My Tags:
Notes:
Detail View
Email this
Export Record
Export Record
» RefWorks
» EndNote
» RIS
» BibTeX
» MARC
» RDF
» RTF
» JSON
» YAML
Add to Favorites
Check in Google Scholar
Add to another List
Edit Favorit
Delete from Favorites
6.
Existence of a purestrategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in imperfectly discriminating contests
Open Access
Title:
Existence of a purestrategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in imperfectly discriminating contests
Author:
Wasser, Cédric
Wasser, Cédric
Minimize authors
Description:
We consider a general class of imperfectly discriminating contests with privately informed players. We show that findings by Athey (2001) imply the existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in monotone pure strategies.
We consider a general class of imperfectly discriminating contests with privately informed players. We show that findings by Athey (2001) imply the existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in monotone pure strategies.
Minimize
Publisher:
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems München
Year of Publication:
2010
Document Type:
doctype:workingPaper
Language:
eng
Subjects:
D72 ; D74 ; D82 ; C72 ; ddc:330 ; contest ; imperfectly discriminating ; asymmetric information ; equilibrium existence ; interdependent values ; Wettbewerb ; Nichtkooperatives Spiel ; Asymmetrische Information ; NashGleichgewicht ; Theorie
D72 ; D74 ; D82 ; C72 ; ddc:330 ; contest ; imperfectly discriminating ; asymmetric information ; equilibrium existence ; interdependent values ; Wettbewerb ; Nichtkooperatives Spiel ; Asymmetrische Information ; NashGleichgewicht ; Theorie
Minimize
DDC:
330 Economics
Rights:
http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
Minimize
Relations:
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper 331
URL:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/93827
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/93827
Minimize
Content Provider:
EconStor (German National Library of Economics, ZBW)
My Lists:
My Tags:
Notes:
Detail View
Email this
Export Record
Export Record
» RefWorks
» EndNote
» RIS
» BibTeX
» MARC
» RDF
» RTF
» JSON
» YAML
Add to Favorites
Check in Google Scholar
Add to another List
Edit Favorit
Delete from Favorites
7.
Existence of a purestrategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in imperfectly discriminating contests
Title:
Existence of a purestrategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in imperfectly discriminating contests
Author:
Wasser, Cédric
Wasser, Cédric
Minimize authors
Description:
We consider a general class of imperfectly discriminating contests with privately informed players. We show that findings by Athey (2001) imply the existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in monotone pure strategies.
We consider a general class of imperfectly discriminating contests with privately informed players. We show that findings by Athey (2001) imply the existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in monotone pure strategies.
Minimize
Year of Publication:
20100701
Document Type:
doctype:workingPaper ; Paper ; NonPeerReviewed
Language:
eng
Subjects:
Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems ; A7  Auktionen ; Anreizprobleme und Wettbewerb ; ddc:330
Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems ; A7  Auktionen ; Anreizprobleme und Wettbewerb ; ddc:330
Minimize
Relations:
http://epub.ub.unimuenchen.de/13223/1/331.pdf ; Wasser, Cédric (Juli 2010): Existence of a purestrategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in imperfectly discriminating contests. SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 331
URL:
http://epub.ub.unimuenchen.de/13223/
http://nbnresolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn=nbn:de:bvb:19epub132238
http://epub.ub.unimuenchen.de/13223/
http://nbnresolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn=nbn:de:bvb:19epub132238
Minimize
Content Provider:
LudwigMaximiliansUniversity Munich: Open Access LMU
My Lists:
My Tags:
Notes:
Detail View
Email this
Export Record
Export Record
» RefWorks
» EndNote
» RIS
» BibTeX
» MARC
» RDF
» RTF
» JSON
» YAML
Add to Favorites
Check in Google Scholar
Add to another List
Edit Favorit
Delete from Favorites
8.
Rentseeking Contests under Symmetric and Asymmetric Information
Title:
Rentseeking Contests under Symmetric and Asymmetric Information
Author:
Wasser, Cédric
Wasser, Cédric
Minimize authors
Description:
We consider a variant of the Tullock rentseeking contest. Under symmetric information we determine equilibrium strategies and prove their uniqueness. Then, we assume contestants to be privately informed about their costs of effort. We prove existence of a purestrategy equilibrium and provide a sufficient condition for uniqueness. Comparing dif...
We consider a variant of the Tullock rentseeking contest. Under symmetric information we determine equilibrium strategies and prove their uniqueness. Then, we assume contestants to be privately informed about their costs of effort. We prove existence of a purestrategy equilibrium and provide a sufficient condition for uniqueness. Comparing different informational settings we find that if players are uncertain about the costs of all players, aggregate effort is lower than under both private and complete information. Yet, under additional assumptions, rent dissipation is still smaller in the latter settings. Numerical examples illustrate that there is no general ranking between private and complete information. The results depend on the distribution costs are drawn from and on the exact specification of the contest success function.
Minimize
Year of Publication:
20100301
Document Type:
doctype:workingPaper ; Paper ; NonPeerReviewed
Language:
eng
Subjects:
Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems ; A7  Auktionen ; Anreizprobleme und Wettbewerb ; ddc:330
Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems ; A7  Auktionen ; Anreizprobleme und Wettbewerb ; ddc:330
Minimize
Relations:
http://epub.ub.unimuenchen.de/13243/1/311.pdf ; Wasser, Cédric (März 2010): Rentseeking Contests under Symmetric and Asymmetric Information. SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 311
URL:
http://epub.ub.unimuenchen.de/13243/
http://nbnresolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn=nbn:de:bvb:19epub132439
http://epub.ub.unimuenchen.de/13243/
http://nbnresolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn=nbn:de:bvb:19epub132439
Minimize
Content Provider:
LudwigMaximiliansUniversity Munich: Open Access LMU
My Lists:
My Tags:
Notes:
Detail View
Email this
Export Record
Export Record
» RefWorks
» EndNote
» RIS
» BibTeX
» MARC
» RDF
» RTF
» JSON
» YAML
Add to Favorites
Check in Google Scholar
Add to another List
Edit Favorit
Delete from Favorites
9.
Signaling in Auctions among Competitors
Open Access
Title:
Signaling in Auctions among Competitors
Author:
von Scarpatetti, Benedikt
;
Wasser, Cédric
von Scarpatetti, Benedikt
;
Wasser, Cédric
Minimize authors
Description:
We consider a model of oligopolistic firms that have private information about their cost structure. Prior to competing in the market a competitive advantage, i.e., a cost reducing technology, is allocated to a subset of the firms by means of a multiobject auction. After the auction either all bids or only the prices to be paid are revealed to ...
We consider a model of oligopolistic firms that have private information about their cost structure. Prior to competing in the market a competitive advantage, i.e., a cost reducing technology, is allocated to a subset of the firms by means of a multiobject auction. After the auction either all bids or only the prices to be paid are revealed to all firms. This provides an opportunity for signaling. Whether there exists an equilibrium in which bids perfectly identify the bidders' costs generally depends on the type and fierceness of the market competition, the specific auction format, and the bid announcement policy.
Minimize
Publisher:
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems München
Year of Publication:
2010
Document Type:
doctype:workingPaper
Language:
eng
Subjects:
D44 ; L13 ; D43 ; D82 ; C72 ; ddc:330 ; Auction ; Oligopoly ; Signaling ; Auktionstheorie ; Signalling ; Wettbewerb ; Theorie
D44 ; L13 ; D43 ; D82 ; C72 ; ddc:330 ; Auction ; Oligopoly ; Signaling ; Auktionstheorie ; Signalling ; Wettbewerb ; Theorie
Minimize
DDC:
330 Economics
Rights:
http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
Minimize
Relations:
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper 293
URL:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/94107
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/94107
Minimize
Content Provider:
EconStor (German National Library of Economics, ZBW)
My Lists:
My Tags:
Notes:
Detail View
Email this
Export Record
Export Record
» RefWorks
» EndNote
» RIS
» BibTeX
» MARC
» RDF
» RTF
» JSON
» YAML
Add to Favorites
Check in Google Scholar
Add to another List
Edit Favorit
Delete from Favorites
10.
Revenue maximizing head starts in contests
Open Access
Title:
Revenue maximizing head starts in contests
Author:
Franke, Jörg
;
Leininger, Wolfgang
;
Wasser, Cédric
Franke, Jörg
;
Leininger, Wolfgang
;
Wasser, Cédric
Minimize authors
Description:
We characterize revenue maximizing head starts for allpay auctions and lottery contests with many heterogeneous players. We show that under optimal head starts allpay auctions revenuedominate lottery contests for any degree of heterogeneity among players. Moreover, allpay auctions with optimal head starts induce higher revenue than any multi...
We characterize revenue maximizing head starts for allpay auctions and lottery contests with many heterogeneous players. We show that under optimal head starts allpay auctions revenuedominate lottery contests for any degree of heterogeneity among players. Moreover, allpay auctions with optimal head starts induce higher revenue than any multiplicatively biased allpay auction or lottery contest. While head starts are more effective than multiplicative biases in allpay auctions, they are less effective than multiplicative biases in lottery contests. ; Wir charakterisieren die erlösmaximierende Gewährung eines "Vorsprungs" für heterogene Spieler in AllPay Auktionen und stochastischen Wettstreiten. Wir zeigen, dass der optimale Gebrauch von Vorteilsgewährung durch Einräumen eines Vorsprungs in AllPay Auktionen immer; d.h. für jeden Grad von Heterogenität unter den Wettstreitern zu höheren Erlösen führt als bei stochastischen Wettstreiten. Darüber hinaus ist Vorsprungsgewährung in AllPay Auktionen ein effektiveres Mittel zur Erlösmaximierung als das multiplikative Gewichten von Einsätzen. Optimale Vorsprungsgewährung führt in AllPay Auktionen zu höheren Erlösen als optimales Gewichten, in stochastischen Wettstreiten ist es jedoch umgekehrt.
Minimize
Publisher:
Essen: RWI
Year of Publication:
2014
Source:
ISBN 9783867885997 ; doi:10.4419/86788599
ISBN 9783867885997 ; doi:10.4419/86788599
Minimize
Document Type:
Report / Research Paper / Working Paper ; Working Paper
Language:
English
Subjects:
Economics (DDC 300) ; jel:C72 ; jel:D72 ; allpay auction ; lottery contest ; head start ; revenue dominance
Economics (DDC 300) ; jel:C72 ; jel:D72 ; allpay auction ; lottery contest ; head start ; revenue dominance
Minimize
DDC:
300 Social sciences
Rights:
http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
Minimize
Relations:
Ruhr Economic Papers; 524
URL:
http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/105441/1/812896769.pdf
http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/105441/1/812896769.pdf
Minimize
Content Provider:
LeibnizOpen (The Leibniz Association)
My Lists:
My Tags:
Notes:
Detail View
Email this
Export Record
Export Record
» RefWorks
» EndNote
» RIS
» BibTeX
» MARC
» RDF
» RTF
» JSON
» YAML
Add to Favorites
Check in Google Scholar
Add to another List
Edit Favorit
Delete from Favorites
Export Record
All Records
Export
» RefWorks
» EndNote
» RIS
» BibTeX
» MARC
» RDF
» RTF
» JSON
» YAML
Adjust your hit list
Sort Your Results
Refine Search Result
More Options
Sort Your Results
Sort by:
Relevance
Author, ZA
Author, AZ
Title, AZ
Title, ZA
Date of publication, descending
Date of publication, ascending
Refine Search Result
Author
(9) Wasser, Cédric
(3) Cédric Wasser
(2) Franke, Jörg
(2) Leininger, Wolfgang
(1) Benedikt von Scarpatetti
(1) Scarpatetti, Benedikt von
(1) von Scarpatetti, Benedikt
Author:
Subject
(8) ddc 330
(4) c72
(4) d72
(4) d82
(3) a7 auktionen
(3) anreizprobleme und wettbewerb
(3) asymmetric information
(3) contest
(3) d74
(3) discussion paper series of sfb tr 15 governance...
(3) theorie
(2) all pay auction
(2) asymmetrische information
(2) auktionstheorie
(2) head start
(2) lottery contest
(2) private values
(2) rent seeking
(2) revenue dominance
(2) wettbewerb
(1) auction
(1) d43
(1) d44
(1) economics ddc 300
(1) equilibrium existence
(1) imperfectly discriminating
(1) interdependent values
(1) jel c72
(1) jel d72
(1) l13
(1) nash gleichgewicht
(1) nichtkooperatives spiel
(1) oligopoly
(1) signaling
(1) signalling
Subject:
Dewey Decimal Classification (DDC)
(5) Economics [33*]
(1) Social sciences, sociology & anthropology...
Dewey Decimal Classification (DDC):
Year of Publication
(7) 2010
(2) 2014
Year of Publication:
Content Provider
(5) EconStor
(3) Munich LMU: Open Access
(3) RePEc.org
(1) LeibnizOpen
Content Provider:
Language
(9) English
(3) Unknown
Language:
Document Type
(9) Reports, Papers, Lectures
(3) Article, Journals
Document Type:
Access
(6) Open Access
(6) Unknown
Access:
More Options
»
Search History
»
Get RSS Feed
»
Get ATOM Feed
»
Email this Search
»
Save Search
»
Browsing
»
Search Plugin
Further result pages
Results:
1

2
Next »
New Search »
Currently in BASE: 72,227,055 Documents of 3,466
Content Sources
About BASE

Contact

BASE Lab

Imprint
© 20042015 by
Bielefeld University Library
Search powered by
Solr
&
VuFind
.
Suggest Repository
BASE Interfaces
Currently in BASE: 72,227,055 Documents of 3,466 Content Sources
http://www.basesearch.net