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1.
Contest Architecture (jointly with Benny Moldovanu)
Title:
Contest Architecture (jointly with Benny Moldovanu)
Author:
Aner Sela
Aner Sela
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Document Type:
preprint
URL:
http://www.econ.ucla.edu/iobara/seminar/architecture.pdf
http://www.econ.ucla.edu/iobara/seminar/architecture.pdf
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RePEc: Research Papers in Economics
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2.
BESTOFTHREE ALLPAY AUCTIONS
Title:
BESTOFTHREE ALLPAY AUCTIONS
Author:
Aner Sela
Aner Sela
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Description:
We study a threestage allpay auction with two players in which the ?rst player to win two matches wins the bestofthree allpay auction. The players have values of winning the contest and may have also values of losing, the latter depending on the stage in which the contest is decided. It is shown that without values of losing, if players are...
We study a threestage allpay auction with two players in which the ?rst player to win two matches wins the bestofthree allpay auction. The players have values of winning the contest and may have also values of losing, the latter depending on the stage in which the contest is decided. It is shown that without values of losing, if players are heterogenous (they have di¤erent values) the bestofthree allpay auction is less competitive (the di¤erence between the players?probabilities to win is larger) as well as less productive (the players?total expected e¤ort is smaller) than the onestage allpay auction. If players are homogenous, however, the productivity and obviously the competitiveness of the bestofthree allpay auction and the onestage allpay auction are identical. These results hold even if players have values of losing that do not depend on the stage in which the contest is decided. However, the bestofthree allpay auction with di¤erent values of losing over the contest?s stages may be more productive than the onestage allpay auction.
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http://www.ec.bgu.ac.il/monaster/admin/papers/0901.pdf
http://www.ec.bgu.ac.il/monaster/admin/papers/0901.pdf
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3.
Fictitious play in `oneagainstall' multiplayer games
Title:
Fictitious play in `oneagainstall' multiplayer games
Author:
Aner Sela
Aner Sela
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Description:
A compound game is an (n + 1) player game based on n twoperson subgames. In each of these subgames player 0 plays against one of the other players. Player 0 is regulated, so that he must choose the same strategy in all n subgames. We show that every fictitious play process approaches the set of equilibria in compound games for which all subgame...
A compound game is an (n + 1) player game based on n twoperson subgames. In each of these subgames player 0 plays against one of the other players. Player 0 is regulated, so that he must choose the same strategy in all n subgames. We show that every fictitious play process approaches the set of equilibria in compound games for which all subgames are either zerosum games, potential games, or $2\times 2$ games. ; Learning, Fictitious play, Zerosum games, Potential games.
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Document Type:
article
URL:
http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/papers/9014003/90140635.pdf
http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/papers/9014003/90140635.pdf
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4.
The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests
Title:
The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests
Author:
Benny Moldovanu
;
Aner Sela
Benny Moldovanu
;
Aner Sela
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Description:
We study a contest with multiple, nonidentical prizes. Participants are privately informed about a parameter (ability) affecting their costs of effort. The contestant with the highest effort wins the first prize, the contestant with the secondhighest effort wins the second prize, and so on until all the prizes are allocated. The contest's desig...
We study a contest with multiple, nonidentical prizes. Participants are privately informed about a parameter (ability) affecting their costs of effort. The contestant with the highest effort wins the first prize, the contestant with the secondhighest effort wins the second prize, and so on until all the prizes are allocated. The contest's designer maximizes expected effort. When cost functions are linear or concave in effort, it is optimal to allocate the entire prize sum to a single "first" prize. When cost functions are convex, several positive prizes may be optimal.
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URL:
http://www.eaer.org/archive/9103/91030542.pdf
http://www.eaer.org/archive/9103/91030542.pdf
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5.
Contests with Ties
Title:
Contests with Ties
Author:
Chen Cohen
;
Aner Sela
Chen Cohen
;
Aner Sela
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Description:
We study twoplayer allpay contests in which there is a positive probability of a tied outcome. We show that the players' efforts in equilibrium do not depend on the expected prize in the case of a tie given that this prize is smaller than the prize for winning. The implications of this result are twofold. First, in symmetric onestage contests...
We study twoplayer allpay contests in which there is a positive probability of a tied outcome. We show that the players' efforts in equilibrium do not depend on the expected prize in the case of a tie given that this prize is smaller than the prize for winning. The implications of this result are twofold. First, in symmetric onestage contests, the designer who wishes to maximize the expected total effort should not award a prize in the case of a tie which is larger than onethird of the prize for winning. Second, in multistage contests, the designer should not limit the number of stages (tiebreaks) but should allow the contest to continue until a winner is decided. ; contests, allpay auctions
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Document Type:
article
URL:
http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1398&context=bejte
http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1398&context=bejte
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6.
A 2 ×2 Game without the Fictitious Play Property
Title:
A 2 ×2 Game without the Fictitious Play Property
Author:
Dov Monderer
;
Aner Sela
Dov Monderer
;
Aner Sela
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Document Type:
preprint
URL:
http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs4583.pdf
http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs4583.pdf
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7.
ALLOCATION OF PRIZES IN CONTESTS WITH PARTICIPATION CONSTRAINTS
Title:
ALLOCATION OF PRIZES IN CONTESTS WITH PARTICIPATION CONSTRAINTS
Author:
Aner Sela
;
Reut Megidish
Aner Sela
;
Reut Megidish
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Description:
We study allpay contests with an exogenous minimal effort constraint where a player can participate in a contest only if his effort (output) is equal to or higher than the minimal effort constraint. Contestants are privately informed about a parameter (ability) that affects their cost of effort. The designer decides about the size and the numbe...
We study allpay contests with an exogenous minimal effort constraint where a player can participate in a contest only if his effort (output) is equal to or higher than the minimal effort constraint. Contestants are privately informed about a parameter (ability) that affects their cost of effort. The designer decides about the size and the number of prizes. We analyze the optimal prize allocation for the contest designer who wishes to maximize either the total effort or the highest effort. It is shown that if the minimal effort constraint is relatively high, the winnertakeall contest in which the contestant with the highest effort wins the entire prize sum does not maximize the expected total effort nor the expected highest effort. In that case, the random contest in which the entire prize sum is equally allocated to all the participants yields a higher expected total effort as well as a higher expected highest effort than the winnertakeall contest. ; Winnertakeall contests, allpay auctions, participation constraints.
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Document Type:
preprint
URL:
http://www.ec.bgu.ac.il/monaster/admin/papers/1008.pdf
http://www.ec.bgu.ac.il/monaster/admin/papers/1008.pdf
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8.
ROUNDROBIN TOURNAMENTS WITH EFFORT CONSTRAINTS
Title:
ROUNDROBIN TOURNAMENTS WITH EFFORT CONSTRAINTS
Author:
Aner Sela
;
Eyal Erez
Aner Sela
;
Eyal Erez
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Description:
We study a roundrobin tournament with n symmetric players where in each of the n1 stages each of the players competes against a different player in the Tullock contest. Each player has a limited budget of effort that decreases within the stages proportionally to the effort he exerted in the previous stages. We show that when the prize for winn...
We study a roundrobin tournament with n symmetric players where in each of the n1 stages each of the players competes against a different player in the Tullock contest. Each player has a limited budget of effort that decreases within the stages proportionally to the effort he exerted in the previous stages. We show that when the prize for winning (value of winning) is equal between the stages, a player's effort is weakly decreasing over the stages. We also show how the contest designer can influence the players' allocation of effort by changing the distribution of prizes between the stages. In particular, we analyze the distribution of prizes over the stages that balance the effort allocation such that a player exerts the same effort over the different stages. In addition, we analyze the distribution of prizes over the stages that maximizes the players' expected total effort.
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Document Type:
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URL:
http://www.ec.bgu.ac.il/monaster/admin/papers/1009.pdf
http://www.ec.bgu.ac.il/monaster/admin/papers/1009.pdf
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9.
CAPS IN SEQUENTIAL CONTESTS
Title:
CAPS IN SEQUENTIAL CONTESTS
Author:
Aner Sela
;
Reut Megidish
Aner Sela
;
Reut Megidish
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Description:
We study a sequential twostage allpay auction with two identical prizes. In each stage, the players compete for one prize and each player may win either one or two prizes. The designer may impose a cap on the players' bids in each of the stages. We analyze the equilibrium in this sequential allpay auction with bid caps and show that capping t...
We study a sequential twostage allpay auction with two identical prizes. In each stage, the players compete for one prize and each player may win either one or two prizes. The designer may impose a cap on the players' bids in each of the stages. We analyze the equilibrium in this sequential allpay auction with bid caps and show that capping the players' bids is pro?table for a designer who wishes to maximize the players' expected total bid. ; Multistage contests, Allpay auctions, Bid caps
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http://www.ec.bgu.ac.il/monaster/admin/papers/1007.pdf
http://www.ec.bgu.ac.il/monaster/admin/papers/1007.pdf
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10.
Fictitious play in coordination games
Title:
Fictitious play in coordination games
Author:
Aner Sela
;
Dorothea Herreiner
Aner Sela
;
Dorothea Herreiner
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Description:
We study the Fictitious Play process with bounded and unbounded recall in pure coordination games for which failing to coordinate yields a payoff of zero for both players. It is shown that every Fictitious Play player with bounded recall may fail to coordinate against his own type. On the other hand, players with unbounded recall are shown to co...
We study the Fictitious Play process with bounded and unbounded recall in pure coordination games for which failing to coordinate yields a payoff of zero for both players. It is shown that every Fictitious Play player with bounded recall may fail to coordinate against his own type. On the other hand, players with unbounded recall are shown to coordinate (almost surely) against their own type as well as against players with bounded recall. In particular, this implies that a FP player's realized average utility is (almost surely) at least as large as his minmax payoff in 2þ2 coordination games. ; Learning · fictitious play · (pure) coordination games
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Document Type:
article
URL:
http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00182/papers/9028002/90280189.pdf
http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00182/papers/9028002/90280189.pdf
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(66) Sela, Aner
(59) Aner Sela
(32) The Pennsylvania State University CiteSeerX...
(22) Moldovanu, Benny
(18) Benny Moldovanu
(8) Dov Monderer
(7) Arieh Gavious
(7) Gadi Fibich
(7) Monderer, Dov
(7) Xianwen Shi
(6) Cohen, Chen
(6) Gavious, Arieh
(5) Chen Cohen
(5) Heidrun C. Hoppe
(5) Kaplan, Todd R.
(4) Ezra Einy
(4) Fibich, Gadi
(4) Hoppe, Heidrun C.
(4) Ori Haimanko
(4) Ram Orzach
(4) Shi, Xianwen
(3) Christian Groh
(3) Dov Samet
(3) Einy, Ezra
(3) Groh, Christian
(3) Haimanko, Ori
(3) Kaplan, Todd
(3) Megidish, Reut
(3) Orzach, Ram
(3) Schlag, Karl H.
(3) Sunde, Uwe
(3) Uwe Sunde
(2) ANER SELA
(2) EINY, Ezra
(2) Ella Segev
(2) HAIMANKO, Ori
(2) HonSnir, Shlomit
(2) Itamar Simonson
(2) Jonah Berger
(2) ORZACH, Ram
(2) Reut Megidish
(2) SELA, Aner
(2) Segev, Ella
(2) Shlomit HonSnir
(2) Todd Kaplan
(2) Todd R. Kaplan
(2) UCL  CORE  Center for Operations Research and...
(2) Wendy Liu
(1) A Arieh Gavious
(1) A. Gavious
(1) A. Sela
(1) An Associate
(1) Aner Sela C
(1) BENNY MOLDOVANU
(1) Baba Shiv
(1) Benny Modovanu
(1) Casper De Vries
(1) Cassie Mogilner
(1) Cohen, Daniel
(1) Dana Sisak
(1) David Wettstein
(1) Developed Richard Barlow
(1) Dorothea Herreiner
(1) Dorothea K. Herreiner
(1) Drew Fudenberg
(1) Economics Department
(1) Erez, Eyal
(1) Eyal Erez
(1) Frank Proschan
(1) G. Fibich (b
(1) Gordon Fisher
(1) HEIDRUN C. HOPPE
(1) HonSuir, S.
(1) Israel Luski
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(1) Jel Classification
(1) Jingfeng Lu Z
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(1) Motty Perry
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(1) R Esearch
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(1) Secondprice Auctions
(1) Simonson, Itamar
(1) Stergio Skaperdas
(1) Steve Matthews
(1) Wettstein, David
(1) Www Elsevier Com
Author:
Subject
(10) 330 wirtschaft
(7) ddc 330
(6) asymmetric auctions
(4) d44
(3) a3 markt und auktionsdesign in komplexen...
(3) common value second price auctions
(3) d82
(3) differential information
(3) discussion paper series of sfb tr 15 governance...
(3) symmetric auctions
(2) all pay auctions
(2) contests
(2) d72
(2) dominant strategies
(2) elimination tournaments
(2) entry costs
(2) information advantage
(2) o31
(2) o32
(2) perturbation analysis
(2) revenue equivalence
(2) seedings
(1) all pay auctions we wish to thank alex ilek
(1) all pay auctions we wish to thank benny moldovanu
(1) art shneyerov and huseyin yildirim for very...
(1) atsu amegashie
(1) auctions
(1) c72
(1) competing auctions
(1) completely revised
(1) connectedness with respect to common value
(1) contest success function
(1) contract
(1) d44 keywords
(1) dan kovenock
(1) dan kovenock and two anonymous referees for very
(1) dominance solvability
(1) entry costs jel classification
(1) first price auctions
(1) head starts
(1) indranil chakraborty
(1) information
(1) jel classi cation numbers
(1) jel classification
(1) michael baye
(1) mike baye
(1) multi prize contest
(1) noisy outputs jel classification
(1) noisy ranking we owe special thanks to...
(1) optimal design
(1) order statistics
(1) original articles
(1) parimal bag
(1) perturbation analy sis
(1) price quotations
(1) private value auctions
(1) risk aversion
(1) seminar für bevölkerungsökonomik
(1) sequential all pay auctions
(1) songnian chen
(1) sophisticated equilibria
(1) tendering
(1) tore
(1) volkswirtschaft
(1) we wish to thank benny moldovanu for helpful...
Subject:
Dewey Decimal Classification (DDC)
(3) Economics [33*]
(2) Social sciences, sociology & anthropology...
(1) Computer science, knowledge & systems [00*]
(1) Library & information sciences [02*]
(1) Mathematics [51*]
(1) Management & public relations [65*]
Dewey Decimal Classification (DDC):
Year of Publication
(10) 2013
(7) 2012
(4) 1997
(4) 2005
(4) 2009
(4) 2011
(3) 2003
(3) 2008
(3) 2014
(2) 1998
(2) 1999
(2) 2000
(2) 2002
(2) 2015
(1) 2001
(1) 2004
(1) 2006
(1) 2010
Year of Publication:
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(74) RePEc.org
(32) CiteSeerX
(10) Mannheim Univ.: MADOC
(4) Munich LMU: Open Access
(4) Exeter Univ.: Open Research Exeter
(3) EconStor
(2) Louvain Univ. Académie: DIAL
(1) HighWire Press
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(46) English
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(76) Article, Journals
(33) Text
(21) Reports, Papers, Lectures
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(36) Open Access
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