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An Evolutionary Analysis of Insurance Markets under Adverse Selection

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Title:

Learning by Imitation when Playing the Field

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We study the properties of learning rules based on imitation in the context of n-player games played among agents within the same population. We find that there are no (nontrivial) rules that increase (average) expected payoffs at each possible state, and for any possible game. The results highlight the complexity of learning by imitation of suc...

We study the properties of learning rules based on imitation in the context of n-player games played among agents within the same population. We find that there are no (nontrivial) rules that increase (average) expected payoffs at each possible state, and for any possible game. The results highlight the complexity of learning by imitation of successful behavior displayed by conspecifics in the presence of strategic considerations within the same population. Minimize

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Evolutionary stability and Nash equilibrium in finite populations, with an application to price competition

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Schaffer (1988) proposed a concept of evolutionary stability for finite-population models that has interesting implications in economic models of evolutionary learning, since it is related to perfectly competitive equilibrium. The present paper explores the relation of this concept to Nash equilibrium in particular classes of games, including co...

Schaffer (1988) proposed a concept of evolutionary stability for finite-population models that has interesting implications in economic models of evolutionary learning, since it is related to perfectly competitive equilibrium. The present paper explores the relation of this concept to Nash equilibrium in particular classes of games, including constant-sum games, games with weak payoff externalities, and games where imitative decision rules are individually improving. An illustration of the latter is provided in the context of Bertrand oligopoly with homogeneous product which allows for a characterization of the set of evolutionarily stable prices. Minimize

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The Open Method of Coordination (OMC) as an Evolutionary Learning Process

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We interpret the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), recently adopted by the EU as a mode of governance in the area of social policy and other fields, as an imitative learning dynamics of the type considered in evolutionary game theory. The best-practise feature and the iterative design of the OMC correspond to the behavioral rule “imitate the be...

We interpret the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), recently adopted by the EU as a mode of governance in the area of social policy and other fields, as an imitative learning dynamics of the type considered in evolutionary game theory. The best-practise feature and the iterative design of the OMC correspond to the behavioral rule “imitate the best.” In a redistribution game with utilitarian governments and mobile welfare beneficiaries, we compare the outcomes of imitative behavior (long-run evolutionary equilibrium), decentralized best-response behaviour (Nash equilibrium), and coordinated policies. The main result is that the OMC allows policy coordination on a strict subset of the set of Nash equilibria, favoring in particular coordination on intermediate values of the policy instrument. ; Open Method of Coordination, Finite-population Evolutionarily Stable Strategy, imitation, mobility, redistribution Minimize

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The Open Method of Coordination (OMC)

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We interpret the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), recently adopted by the EU as a mode of governance in the area of social policy and other ¯elds, as an imitative learning dynamics of the type considered in evolutionary game theory. The best-practise feature and the iterative design of the OMC correspond to the behavioral rule \imitate the bes...

We interpret the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), recently adopted by the EU as a mode of governance in the area of social policy and other ¯elds, as an imitative learning dynamics of the type considered in evolutionary game theory. The best-practise feature and the iterative design of the OMC correspond to the behavioral rule \imitate the best." In a redistribution game with utilitarian gov- ernments and mobile welfare bene¯ciaries, we compare the outcomes of imitative behavior (long-run evolutionary equilibrium), decentralized best-response behavior (Nash equilibrium), and coordinated policies. The main result is that the OMC allows policy coordination on a strict subset of the set of Nash equilibria, favoring in particular coordination on intermediate values of the policy instrument. Minimize

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An Evolutionary Analysis of Insurance Markets

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Since the seminal work by Rothschild and Stiglitz on competitive insurance markets under adverse selection the problem of non-existence of equilibrium has puzzled many economists. In this paper we approach this problem from an evo- lutionary point of view. In a dynamic model insurance companies remove loss- making contracts from the market and c...

Since the seminal work by Rothschild and Stiglitz on competitive insurance markets under adverse selection the problem of non-existence of equilibrium has puzzled many economists. In this paper we approach this problem from an evo- lutionary point of view. In a dynamic model insurance companies remove loss- making contracts from the market and copy prot-making ones. Occasionally, they also experiment, adding new contracts or removing current ones arbitrarily. We show that the Rothschild-Stiglitz outcome arises in the long run if it consti- tutes an equilibrium in the static framework, but also if it is not an equilibrium, provided that rms only experiment with contracts in the vicinity of their current portfolio. Minimize

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The Evolutionary Logic of Feeling Small

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In a (generalized symmetric aggregative game, payoffs depend only on individual strategy and an aggregate of all strategies. Players behaving as if they were negligible would optimize taking the aggregate as given. We provide evolutionary and dynamic foundations for such behavior when the game satisfies supermodularity conditions. The results ob...

In a (generalized symmetric aggregative game, payoffs depend only on individual strategy and an aggregate of all strategies. Players behaving as if they were negligible would optimize taking the aggregate as given. We provide evolutionary and dynamic foundations for such behavior when the game satisfies supermodularity conditions. The results obteined are also useful to characterize evolutionarily stable strategies in a finite population. Minimize

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The Asset Market Game

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This paper models asset markets as a game where assets pay according to an arbitrary payoff matrix,investors decide on fractions of wealth to allocate to each asset,and prices result from market clearing. The only pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is to split wealth proportionally to the assets´expected returns, which can be interpreted as investin...

This paper models asset markets as a game where assets pay according to an arbitrary payoff matrix,investors decide on fractions of wealth to allocate to each asset,and prices result from market clearing. The only pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is to split wealth proportionally to the assets´expected returns, which can be interpreted as investing according to the fundamentals. Further, the equilibrium is evolutionarily stable in the sense of Schaffer (1988). We also study the stability properties of the equilibrium in an evolutionary dynamics where wealth flows with higher probability into those strategies that obtain higher realized payoffs. Minimize

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Title:

Learning by Imitation when Playing the Field

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We study the properties of learning rules based on imitation in the context of n-player games played among agents within the same population. We find that there are no (nontrivial) rules that increase (average) expected payoffs at each possible state, and for any possible game. The results highlight the complexity of learning by imitation of suc...

We study the properties of learning rules based on imitation in the context of n-player games played among agents within the same population. We find that there are no (nontrivial) rules that increase (average) expected payoffs at each possible state, and for any possible game. The results highlight the complexity of learning by imitation of successful behavior displayed by conspecifics in the presence of strategic considerations within the Minimize

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The Pennsylvania State University CiteSeerX Archives

Year of Publication:

2011-10-28

Source:

http://mailbox.univie.ac.at/Papers.Econ/RePEc/vie/viennp/vie0005.pdf

http://mailbox.univie.ac.at/Papers.Econ/RePEc/vie/viennp/vie0005.pdf Minimize

Document Type:

text

Language:

en

Subjects:

Key Words ; learning ; imitation

Key Words ; learning ; imitation Minimize

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Metadata may be used without restrictions as long as the oai identifier remains attached to it.

Metadata may be used without restrictions as long as the oai identifier remains attached to it. Minimize

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Title:

z

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Since the seminal work by Rothschild and Stiglitz on competitive insurance markets under adverse selection the problem of non-existence of equilibrium has puzzled many economists. In this paper we approach this problem from an evo-lutionary point of view. In a dynamic model insurance companies remove loss-making contracts from the market and cop...

Since the seminal work by Rothschild and Stiglitz on competitive insurance markets under adverse selection the problem of non-existence of equilibrium has puzzled many economists. In this paper we approach this problem from an evo-lutionary point of view. In a dynamic model insurance companies remove loss-making contracts from the market and copy prot-making ones. Occasionally, they also experiment, adding new contracts or removing current ones arbitrarily. We show that the Rothschild-Stiglitz outcome arises in the long run if it consti-tutes an equilibrium in the static framework, but also if it is not an equilibrium, provided that rms only experiment with contracts in the vicinity of their current portfolio. Minimize

Contributors:

The Pennsylvania State University CiteSeerX Archives

Year of Publication:

2014-11-30

Source:

http://homepage.univie.ac.at/Papers.Econ/RePEc/vie/viennp/vie9808.pdf

http://homepage.univie.ac.at/Papers.Econ/RePEc/vie/viennp/vie9808.pdf Minimize

Document Type:

text

Language:

en

Subjects:

Insurance market ; adverse selection ; evolutionary game theory ; imita- tion ; mutation ; withdrawal

Insurance market ; adverse selection ; evolutionary game theory ; imita- tion ; mutation ; withdrawal Minimize

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Metadata may be used without restrictions as long as the oai identifier remains attached to it.

Metadata may be used without restrictions as long as the oai identifier remains attached to it. Minimize

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